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SUPERIOR ORDERS AS A DEFENSE TO VIOLATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
By ALAN M. WILNER*
I.
INTRODUCTION
Some twenty years ago, there began in Nuremberg, Germany, a
series of trials which some writers have hailed as a milestone in the
development of international law. These trials - the major war
criminals were tried by the International Military Tribunal and the
subordinate officials under Allied Control Council Law No. 10 - were
the subject of considerable controversy in Germany and in the West.
The controversy has not substantially lessened in the last two decades.
Much of the debate concerned the question whether a military
tribunal composed of representatives of victorious powers had juris-
diction to try individuals previously employed in the service of a
defeated power. The old maxim of nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena
sine lege was much discussed as a bar to the prosecutions, the theory
being that the acts in question were not crimes when committed. These
may be termed general or organic defenses, independent of the par-
ticular charge or indictment, and it is not the purpose of this article
to discuss these questions. Neither is it the purpose to debate whether
the trials can be justified on some theory of natural law which would
supersede the positive municipal law under which some of the alleged
criminal acts were committed.
Rather, it is the function of this article to examine what was
probably the most popular personal (as opposed to organic) defense
offered by the various defendants, i.e., that the acts charged to them
were committed under orders from military or civilian superiors to
whom a duty of obedience was owed. This defense is a timeless one
which can arise in almost any type of situation, both in peace and
in war, and it bears some study. This article will consider, in an
historical context, how the defense of superior orders has been treated
by the various nations of the world and what its future is likely to be.
II.
NATURE OF THE DEFENSE OF SUPERIOR ORDERS
"Superior orders" as a defense evolves from the duty of obedience
which soldiers of all nations owe to their superior officers. The essen-
tial question is not the existence of such a duty, which cannot be denied,
but rather its quality, i.e., how absolute is the duty. The scope of the
duty (and therefore its availability as a defense) requires consideration
of two factors:
1. To what actions, if any, can it intrinsically be inapplicable?
2. What consequences would flow in any given situation if the
duty is violated?
* B.A., 1958, Johns Hopkins University; LL.B., 1962, University of Maryland;
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The first factor involves the question of whether certain actions,
such as deliberate murder or pillage, or other actions clearly in viola-
tion of known criminal law (either municipal or international) can
ever be subjected to the duty of obedience, and if so, under what cir-
cumstances. Or, to paraphrase the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg, do individuals have international duties which transcend
the national obligations of obedience imposed by the State? This is
not an easy question to answer, because in addition to the moral con-
flict involved in the question itself, there must also be considered the
problem of mens rea - did the subordinate know that the act in
question was illegal? A specific problem here is whether the act,
ordinarily illegal, could be legal as a reprisal.
The second factor is equally important. How far must one sacrifice
himself in violating his national duty of obedience? Is the defense of
superior orders affected by the greater or lesser degree of duress? The
interaction of these two factors and the multitude of situations which
can be developed therefrom is the subject of this article.
III.
TREATMENT OF SUPERIOR ORDERS BY THE VARIOUS NATIONS
Since the development of international law as we know it is com-
paratively recent, it is quite understandable that "superior orders"
received its first judicial consideration in a national context. The
earliest modern cases occurred in the United States in which the
defense was generally rejected.
In 1804, the Supreme Court in Little v. Barreme' held that the
captain of a U.S. frigate who wrongfully captured a neutral ship pur-
suant to an unauthorized order from the President was liable for civil
damages. After determining that the capture was, in fact, unlawful,
Chief Justice Marshall, reversing his earlier thoughts on the matter,
concluded, "that the instructions cannot change the nature of the trans-
action, or legalize an act which without those instructions would have
been a plain trespass."2
In 1813, a federal circuit court again considered and rejected this
defense.' There, the crew of an American privateer was charged with
piracy for stopping a neutral vessel, assaulting her captain and crew
and stealing certain merchandise. To the claim that the crew acted
pursuant to orders of the captain, the court stated:
This doctrine, equally alarming and unfounded . .. is repugnant
to reason, and to the positive law of the land. No military or civil
officer can command an inferior to violate the laws of his country;
nor will such command excuse, much less justify the act .... We
do not mean to go further than to say, that the participation of
the inferior officer, in an act which he knows, or ought to know
to be illegal, will not be excused by the order of his superior
1. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 170 (1804).
2. Id. at 178.
3. United States v. Jones, 36 Fed. Cas. 653 (No. 15494) (C.C.D. Pa. 1813).
4. Id. at 657.
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Almost four decades later, the Supreme Court again had the ques-
tion before it in the case of Mitchell v. Harmony.' There, the plaintiff
left Missouri with considerable livestock and merchandise, intending
to trade in Mexico at a time when such trade was legal. While en
route, war with Mexico was declared; the Army was sent to overtake
him, which it did. After trailing along behind the Army for some time,
the plaintiff wished to go his own way, but the defendant, a colonel
acting under orders, refused to let him leave, as a result of which his
goods were eventually lost. In holding the defendant liable for damages,
the court stated:
Consequently, the order given was an order to do an illegal act;
to commit a trespass upon the property of another; and can afford
no justification to the person to whom it was executed. . . . And
upon principle, independent of the weight of judicial decision, it
can never be maintained that a military officer can justify himself
for doing an unlawful act, by producing the order of his superior.
The order may palliate, but it cannot justify.
The plain implication of Mitchell v. Harmony appears to have
been overlooked in McCall v. McDowell.7 There, in response to a
general order from his commanding officer, the defendant arrested
the plaintiff and had him escorted under guard to a military post,
where he was imprisoned. The order was part of an attempt to quell an
outbreak of riots in California following President Lincoln's assassi-
nation. In awarding judgment for the defendant in plaintiff's suit for
false imprisonment, the court stated:
Except in a plain case of excess of authority, where at first blush
it is apparent and palpable to the commonest understanding that
the order is illegal, I cannot but think that the law should excuse
the military subordinate when acting in obedience to the orders
of his commander.'
Without citing Mitchell v. Harmony or the other cases noted
above, the court accepted superior orders as a defense except where
the order is "so palpably atrocious as well as illegal, that one must
instinctively feel that it ought not to be obeyed, by whomever given." 9
The conclusion of Mitchell v. Harmony was reasserted, however,
in Dow v. Johnson.'° There, though voiding a judgment obtained
against a military commander for want of jurisdiction in the lower
court, the Supreme Court stated, "We do not controvert the doctrine of
Mitchell v. Harmony, . .. ; on the contrary, we approve it.""
Criminal liability for outrageous acts in direct violation of the
laws of war was declared in the trial of Henry Wirz, the commandant
5. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851).
6. Id. at 136.
7. 15 Fed. Cas. 1235 (No. 8673) (C.C.D. Cal. 1867).
8. Id. at 1240.
9. Id. at 1241.
10. 100 U.S. 158 (1880).
11. Id. at 169.
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of the infamous Confederate prison at Andersonville.'2 The fact of
superior orders was relied upon by Wirz, but does not appear to have
been set forth as a formal plea. The Court Martial mentioned it only
inferentially in announcing Wirz's guilt.
In later cases, the courts tended to be somewhat more lenient in
their rejection of the defense, but only on the basis that the acts in
question were not clearly known to be illegal, rather than as a change
in attitude towards the intrinsic nature of the defense. In Freeland v.
Williams," for example, the Supreme Court struck down a judgment
entered against a former member of the Confederate Army for taking
cattle from the plaintiff under orders from his superior officer.
Later, a federal circuit court acquitted a corporal of manslaughter
when, on orders from his sergeant, he killed a fugitive who had escaped
from detention. 14 The basis of the court's decision was:
The illegality of the order, if illegal it was, was not so much so as
to be apparent and palpable to the commonest understanding. If,
then, the petitioners acted under such order in good faith, without
any criminal intent, but with an honest purpose to perform a sup-
posed duty, they are not liable to prosecution under the criminal
laws of the state.'5
Aside from the effect of administration and statutory regulations,
discussed infra, there does not appear to have been any substantial
change in the attitude of American courts as expressed in the above
cases.1 6 It can be stated with some degree of authority that, even in
time of war, "superior orders" was not a defense to a clearly illegal
act in American law.
The law in Great Britain was quite similar. In the early case of
Ensign Maxwell, who, under orders, killed a French prisoner during
the Napoleonic Wars by firing into a cell, the Scottish court rejected
the plea of superior orders, declaring:
If an officer were to command a soldier to go out to the street and
to kill you or me, he would not be bound to obey. It must be a
legal order given with reference to the circumstances in which he
is placed; and thus every officer has a discretion to disobey orders
against the known laws of the land. 7
In 1900, the doctrine of rejection was restated in a modified form
in Regina v. Smith.18 There, a soldier fighting in the Boer War, on
12. For a discussion of the trial, see H55SVLTIN9, CIVIL WAR PRISONs 237-45
(1930).
13. 131 U.S. 405 (1889).
14. In re Fair, 100 Fed. 149 (D. Neb. 1900).
15. Id. at 155 (emphasis added).
16. See United States v. Clark, 31 Fed. 710 (E.D. Mich. 1887) ; Neu v. McCarthy,
309 Mass. 17, 33 N.E.2d 570 (1941) ; Commonwealth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. 165, 55 Ati.
952 (1903).
17. II BUCHANAN, REPORTS Or RiwARKABL TRIALS 3, 58 (1813).
18. 17 Cape Reports 561 (S. Africa 1900).
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orders from his superior officer, killed a native for failing to perform
some menial task. Though acquitting him, the court stated:
I think it is a safe rule to lay down that if a soldier honestly
believes he is doing his duty in obeying commands of his superior,
and if the orders are not so manifestly illegal that he must or
ought to have known that they were unlawful, the private soldier
would be protected by the orders of his superior officer."9
This decision would seem to be in accord with the American
position as expressed in the Fair case. Paradoxically, however, what
the United States and Great Britain refused to accept into their
municipal law, they countenanced in their international law.
In 1863, after observing the horror of the first years of the Ameri-
can Civil War, Dr. Francis Lieber drafted a code of conduct for the
United States Army, which later became the basis for the codified
laws of war and the various international conventions relating thereto.",
Although it set out rules of warfare dealing with prisoners, the
wounded, civilians, etc., it was silent on the question of whether
superior orders could justify a violation of any of the rules. If the
subject occurred to him at all, Lieber no doubt assumed that the rules
previously announced by the courts would apply.
In 1913, the British introduced the concept of superior orders as
a defense in their military manual2' in apparent opposition to the
attitude previously taken by their courts. As expressed later in the
1929 edition, the manual provided:
It is important, however, to note that members of the armed
forces who commit such violations of the recognized rules of war-
fare as are ordered by their Government, or by their commander,
are not war criminals and cannot therefore be punished by the
enemy. He may punish the officials or commanders responsible for
such orders if they fall into his hands, but otherwise he may only
resort to the other means of obtaining redress which are dealt
with in this chapter [i.e., reprisals]. 22
The basis for this change appears to have been the influence of
Professor Oppenheim, one of the recognized authorities in international
law and a co-author of the manual. In the second edition of his treatise
on International Law, published in 1912, he stated:
Violations of rules regarding warfare are war crimes only when
committed without an order of the belligerent Government con-
cerned. If members of the armed forces commit violations by
order of their Government, they are not war criminals and may
19. Ibid.
20. LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT Op ARMIES OF THE UNITED
STATES IN THE FIELD (1863).
21. EDMONDS & OPPENHEIM, BRITISH LAND WARFARE, AN EXPOSITION OF TilE
LAWS AND USAGES OF WAR ON LAND FOR THE GUIDANCE OF OFFICERS OF His
MAJESTY'S ARMY (1913).
22. Op. cit. supra note 21, ch. XIV, part X(iii), § 443 (1929 ed.).
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not be punished by the enemy. . . . In case members of forces
commit violations ordered by their commanders, the members may
not be punished, for the commanders are alone responsible, and
the latter may, therefore, be punished as war criminals on their
capture by the enemy."
Following the British lead, the United States amended its Manual
in 1914, so that for the first time it read:
Individuals of the armed forces will not be punished for these
offenses in case they are committed under the orders or sanction
of their government or commanders. The commanders ordering
the commission of such acts, or under whose authority they are
committed by their troops, may be punished by the belligerent
into whose hands they may fall.24
The force of these administrative regulations was somewhat un-
certain, being in apparent conflict with the municipal law of the respec-
tive countries. Lauterpacht pointed out that, at least as to the British
part, it had no statutory force, "is not believed to represent a sound
principle of the law of war, and is in no sense binding upon Great
Britain in the international sphere."25 If this be the case, then the
regulation was of no force or value at all, since (a) as to a British
soldier tried in Great Britain, the rules adopted by the British courts
would presumably apply; (b) as to an enemy soldier tried in Great
Britain, it would have no force; (c) as to a British soldier tried in an
enemy country, it would not be binding; and (d) as to an enemy soldier
tried in his own country, it would not be applicable.
Curiously, in Imperial Germany and Austria, where the duty of
obedience was thought to be absolute, a different rule was in effect.
The Prussian Military Code of 1845 stated that a subordinate would
be punished if he executed an order knowing that it "related to an act
which obviously aimed at a crime. '"26 Such liability was extended to
Saxony in 1867, to Bavaria in 1869, and to Baden in 1870. Finally,
the Reichstag in 1872 adopted Article 47 of the German Military Code,
which established liability on the part of the subordinate for com-
mitting an act under orders "(2) if he knew that the order of the
superior concerned an act which aimed at a civil or military crime
or offense."
'27
The Military Penal Code of Austria-Hungary, Article 158, formu-
lated in 1855, excused a subordinate from his duty of obedience if "the
order pertains to an act or omission in which evidently a crime or an
offense is to be recognized. ' 2 8
23. II OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 310 (2d ed. 1912).
24. RULES OF LAND WARFARE, U.S.A. ch. X, § 366 (1914). This section appears
in the 1940 edition and was unchanged, BASIC FIELD MANUAL (FM 27-10) § 347
(1940).
25. Lauterpacht, The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes, 21
RRIT. YB. INT'L L. 58 (1944).
26. United States v. Ohlendorf, IV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE TiiE
NURENBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 471 (1949) (hereinafter cited as TRIALS).
27. Ibid.
28. Id. at 471-72.
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The French position was somewhat unclear. Article 64 of the
French Criminal Code provided that an act committed by a person con-
strained by force was not a crime. Whether or not superior orders con-
stituted such a constraint was the subject of divided opinion. 29 Garner
was inclined to believe that the French rejected the defense, stating:
This is the view adopted by the great majority of French jurists
who have discussed the question. They maintain that every person
who had any share in the commission of a criminal act during war,
the private soldier who commits it, the officer who delivers the
order to him, the commander from whom it emanates, and even
the chief of state who is ultimately responsible, may be tried and
punished if found guilty.30
During the First World War, the Allies began to think in terms
of punishing members of the German forces who had violated the recog-
nized rules of warfare - from conscripted privates to the Kaiser.
This required a second look at the problem of superior orders. Profes-
sor Bellot signified the change in thinking by urging the abolition of
superior orders as a defense. His view was that the authors and per-
petrators of war crimes should be tried for the deterrent effect.3 1
The French courts - whatever interpretation may be given to
their municipal law - apparently rejected the defense when dealing
with captured Germans. As stated by Garner, "In every case where
the plea of superior command was invoked, the courts made short shrift
of it, and if the evidence established the guilt of the accused, he was
condemned even when he produced conclusive proof that he acted
under orders." '3 2
When the Preliminary Peace Conference met in Paris, it created
a commission to study the problem of responsibility for the war. On
March 29, 1919, the commission3 3 presented its report to the Confer-
ence. It recommended that those persons (Germans) accused of per-
petrating war crimes be brought to trial before the International Court.
As to superior orders, the commission stated in Chapter III of its report:
We desire to say that civil and military authorities cannot be
relieved from responsibility by the mere fact that a higher authority
might have been convicted of the same offense. It will be for the
court to decide whether a plea of superior orders is sufficient to
acquit the person charged from responsibility. 4
Acting upon the commission's recommendation, the Allies inserted
Article 228 into the Versailles Treaty, by which Germany recognized
29. Holding that the exemption applies to soldiers under orders, see 26 Rnv. GrN.
zimDRoIT INT. PUB. 123 (1919). Contra, 24 Rgv. GEN. DEDROIT INT. PUB. 53 (1917).
30. Garner, Punishment of Offenders against the Laws and Customs of War, 14
AM. J. INT'L L. 70, 87 (1920).
31. Bellot, War Crimes: Their Prosecution and Punishment, 11 TRANSACT. GROT.
Soc'y 31, 45 et seq. (1917).
32. Garner, supra note 30, at 87.
33. Officially known as the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of
tie War and on Enforcement of Penalties.
34. 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 95, 117 (1920).
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"the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military
tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the
laws and customs of war." 35 Although the treaty was silent on the
question of superior orders as a defense, it would appear, in view of
the commission's recommendation and the attitude of the Allied powers,
that it was not intended to be considered as an absolute defense, but
rather one which could be recognized in indivdual cases.
Garner summarized the effect of Article 228 in the following terms:
This appears to be the first treaty of peace in which an attempt has
been made by the victorious belligerent to enforce against the
defeated adversary the application of the principle of individual re-
sponsibility for criminal acts during war by members of his armed
forces against the persons or property of the other party."0
The treaty required that the German Government deliver up to the
Allies all persons accused of committing war crimes for trial in accord-
ance with Article 228. When the demand was made, however, Ger-
many became reluctant to perform her duty; after some negotiation,
a "compromise" was reached whereby the accused persons were tried
by the German Supreme Court, sitting in Leipzig.
The Leipzig trials, as a whole, were declared to be a farce. Of
the 896 persons initially accused by the Allied powers, twelve were
actually tried, and six of these were acquitted. The longest sentence
given was four years' imprisonment, and the defendant receiving it
"escaped" after a few months and fled in safety to Sweden. As a result
of these events, the Allied representatives withdrew, and further
charges were not pressed.
Two of the cases decided at Leipzig are of interest, however, as
they established, at least academically, that there are certain areas in
which the doctrine of superior orders is inapplicable. In The Lland-
overy Castle,37 the defendants were lieutenants aboard a U-boat which
torpedoed a Canadian hospital ship, allegedly in contravention of the
Hague Convention. After the ship sank, the U-boat fired on the sur-
vivors' lifeboats, apparently sinking two of them. The firing was on
orders from the captain, the defendants' participation being in observ-
ing the lifeboats and maintaining lookout so as to permit the firing
to continue without danger to the U-boat. Relying on Paragraph 47 (2)
of the German Military Penal Code, the court stated:
It is certainly to be urged in favor of the military subordinates
that they are under no obligation to question the order of their
superior officer, and they can count upon its legality. But no such
confidence can be held to exist, if such an order is universally
known to everybody, including the accused, to be without any
doubt whatever against the law.3 8
35. 29 HERTSLET, COMMERCIAL TREATIEs 705-06 (ed. Nicoll & Berrow 1923).
36. Garner, supra note 30, at 70-71.
37. [1923] Ann. Dig. 436 (No. 235).
38. Id. at 437.
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Upon this principle the defendants were convicted. However, in a
companion case, The Dover Castle,89 a different result was reached.
There, a U-boat torpedoed a British hospital ship which was escorted
by two destroyers. There was no firing on survivors as in Llandovery
Castle; in fact, the U-boat stayed in the area until all survivors were
rescued, and did not actually sink the ship until rescue operations had
been concluded. The captain claimed that he acted on orders from the
German Admiralty in firing on the hospital ship. The orders were
based on the supposition that the British were using hospital ships for
military purposes; and warnings of the orders had previously been
communicated to Great Britain. They were thus in the nature of
reprisals. On these facts, the defendant captain was acquitted, the
court holding that the orders were not, in the defendant's mind, so
patently illegal as to fall within the purview of Paragraph 47(2).
As a result of the disappointment at Leipzig where, in addition
to the cases noted above, all of the top admirals were exonerated on
the basis of superior orders, the doctrine was the subject of much dis-
cussion among students of international law during the postwar years.
Lord Cave, in an address to the Grotius Society in 1922, urged a
return to the standard of Regina v. Smith,40 which, he held, "limits
the impunity of the soldier to cases where the orders are not so mani-
festly illegal that he must or ought to have known that they were un-
lawful."'" Finch, quoting Stephens, urged that a soldier should be
protected "by orders for which he might reasonably believe his officer
to have good grounds." '42 The theory that superior orders should be
an absolute defense, said Finch, 48 "would be fatal to military discipline
itself, for it would justify the private in shooting the colonel by the
orders of the captain, or in deserting to the enemy on the field of battle
on the orders of his immediate superior." Finally, he concluded:
The unqualified acceptance of the principle that a subordinate is
not responsible for what he does under orders of his superiors will
make it practically impossible to enforce proper penalties for viola-
tions of the laws of war designed to humanize, if such be possible,
that grim recourse.44
This view was not universally held, however. The field manuals
remained unchanged, and the numerous treaties of the 1920's were
silent on the subject." The one exception to this was the Washington
Treaty of 1922, dealing, inter alia, with submarine warfare. After
setting out certain rules relating to such warfare, Article III provided:
Any person in the service of any Power who shall violate any of
those rules, whether or not such person is under orders of a
39. [1923] Ann. Dig. 429 (No. 231).
40. 17 Cape Reports 561 (S. Africa 1900).
41. VIII TRANSACT. GROT. SOc'Y xxiii (1923).
42. Finch, Superior Orders and War Crimes, 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 440, 443 (1921).
43. Ibid.
44. Finch, supra note 42, at 445.
45. See, in particular, the Geneva Convention concerning the treatment of
prisoners of war, concluded on July 27, 1929. 47 Stat. 2074 (1931-33).
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governmental superior, shall be deemed to have violated the laws
of war and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an
act of piracy . 4
This treaty was ratified by the United States, Great Britain, Italy
and Japan. It was rejected by France. Thus, wrote Manner:
It appears to be equally admitted that the defenses of act of state
and superior orders . . . condition any prosecution for war crimes.
The very fact that one writer suggests a reappraisal of these
orthodox principles is only further proof of their general accept-
ance in positive law.
4 7
Similarly, Cohn, in a paper presented to the Grotius Society, stated
that "in international law the defence of superior orders would appear
to hold good. Any other attitude would be highly impracticable." 48
With the commencement and progression of World War II, how-
ever, the existence of war crimes was presented on a scale theretofore
considered unbelievable; once again, plans were made for punishing
those who committed them.49 It was immediately recognized that, if
the results of Leipzig were not to be repeated, some changes in the
doctrine of superior orders would have to be considered. As noted
by Lauterpacht in 1944:
It is clear that, unless the scope of prosecutions for war crimes is
to be drastically and unduly curtailed, any British enactment
relating to the prosecution of war crimes by British courts, mili-
tary and other, will have to free them, by means of an express
provision from the shackles of the rule as at present formulated.
One of the first steps in changing the doctrine was the amendment
of the American and British field manuals which, as noted, had accepted
superior orders as a defense since 1914. Thus, in April, 1944, Amend-
ment No. 34, which read as follows, was added to the British manual:
The fact that a rule of warfare has been violated in pursuance of
an order of the belligerent Government or of an individual belliger-
ent commander does not deprive the act in question of its character
as a war crime; neither does it, in principle, confer upon the
perpetrator immunity from punishment by the injured belligerent.
Undoubtedly, a court confronted with the plea of superior orders
46. Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements between
the United States of America and Other Powers, Vol. III (1910-23), 67th Congress.
Document No. 348 (1923), p. 3118.
47. Manner, The Legal Nature and Punishment of Criminal Acts of Violence
Contrary to the Laws of War, 37 Am. J. INT'L L. 406, 433 (1943).
48. Cohn, The Problem of War Crimes Today, XXVI TRANSACT. GROT. Soc'Y
125, 144 (1941). For further discussion see 2 WHEATON, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1159(6th ed. 1929) and 2 WHEATON, INTERNATIONAL LAW 586 (7th ed. 1943).
49. The many declarations, statements, resolutions and conferences relating to
these plans, too numerous to enumerate, are printed in the REPORT or ROBERT H.
JACKSON, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONPERENCE ON MILIT'rAY
TRIALS, Dept. of State Publication 3080 (1947) (hereinafter cited as REPORT).
50. Lauterpacht, supra note 25, at 58, 69 et seq.
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adduced in justification of a war crime is bound to take into con-
sideration the fact that obedience to military orders, not obviously
unlawful, is the duty of every member of the armed forces and
that the latter cannot, in conditions of war discipline, be expected to
weigh scrupulously the legal merits of the order received. The
question, however, is governed by the major principle that mem-
bers of the armed forces are bound to obey lawful orders only
and that they cannot therefore escape liability if, in obedience to
a command, they commit acts which both violate unchallenged
rules of warfare and outrage the general sentiment of humanity.5'
Following suit, the United States, on November 15, 1944, amended
its field manual by adding Section 345 (1):
Individuals and organizations who violate the accepted laws and
customs of war may be punished therefor. However, the fact that
the acts complained of were done pursuant to order of a superior
or government sanction may be taken into consideration in deter-
mining culpability, either by way of defense or in mitigation of
punishment. The person giving such orders may also be punished. 52
Though willing to amend its position somewhat, the United States
was unwilling to make such a complete reversal as the British - at
least with regard to the field manual. The reason for this recalcitrance
is somewhat curious, particularly in view of the strongly worded state-
ments of Congress and the President concerning the punishment of war
criminals, 53 and the established attitude of the American courts toward
this defense.
In an attempt to be consistent with her allies, and to clear up any
ambiguities in her own municipal law, France enacted an ordinance
on August 28, 1944, to the effect that superior orders cannot be pleaded
as justification but can be admitted as "extenuating or exculpating
circumstances."54  The Canadians, too, amended their practice by
promulgating new regulations holding that superior orders are not an
absolute defense, but may be considered as a defense or in mitigation ifjustice so requires.55 Extensive research has not, to the author's
knowledge, been done on the position of the U.S.S.R. relating to
superior orders. Greenspan has described the Soviet law as follows:
Under Soviet Russian military law, a soldier carrying out the un-
lawful order of an officer incurs no responsibility for the crime,
which is that of the officer, except where the soldier fulfills an
order which is clearly criminal, in which case the soldier is respon-
sible together with the officer who issued the order.56
51. I WAR CRIMES TRIALS, Appendix II, at 150 (1948).
52. Op. cit. supra note 51, at 152.
53. REPORT, op. cit. supra note 49.
54. See 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 568 n.1 (7th ed. Lauterpacht 1952).
55. Art. 15, CANADIAN WAR CRIMES REGULATIONS or 1945.
56. GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW or LAND WARFARE 491 (1959).
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IV.
NUREMBERG AND AFTER
Near the end of the war, more detailed plans were made for the
post-bellum trial of war criminals. In contrast to its position on its
own field manual, the United States presented a draft agreement for
war crimes trials to a Conference of Foreign Ministers in San Francisco
in April, 1945, which contained a provision relating to superior orders
almost identical with the Canadian regulation cited above. The final
agreement was concluded in London on August 8, 1945, by which the
International Military Tribunal was created to try the "top" leaders
of the German State, Government and Armed Forces. Annexed to
the London agreement was the Charter of the Tribunal, which provided,
in Article 8, "The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of
his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility,
but may be considered in mitigation of punishment, if the Tribunal
determines that justice so requires."57
In his opening address before the Tribunal, Mr. Justice Jackson,
Chief Prosecutor for the United States, defined Article 8 in the fol-
lowing terms:
Of course, we do not agree that the circumstances under which
one commits an act should be disregarded in judging its legal
effect. A conscripted private on a firing squad cannot expect to
hold an inquest on the validity of the execution. The Charter
implies common sense limits to liability just as it places common
sense limits upon immunity.5
The defense raised the question of superior orders, and argued:
The functionaries had neither the right nor the duty to examine
the orders of the monocrat to determine their legality ... that an
order by the Fuhrer was binding - and indeed legally binding -
on the person to whom it was given, even if the directive was con-
trary to international law or to other traditional values.59
To this defense the Tribunal replied:
The provisions of this article are in conformity with the law of
all nations. That a soldier was ordered to kill or torture in viola-
tion of the international law of war has never been recognized as
a defense to such acts of brutality, though, so the Charter here
provides, the order may be urged in mitigation of the punishment.
The true test, which is found in varying degrees in the criminal
law of most nations is not the existence of the order, but whether
moral choice was in fact possible."9
The Tribunal, of course, was limited by its Charter, which rejected
superior orders as defense. Thus, the only consideration was the degree
57. RZPORT, op. cit. supra note 49, at 350.
58. II TRIAL Ol THZ MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 150-51 (1947).
59. Id. at Vol. XXIII, p. 489.
60. Id. at Vol. XXII, p. 466 (emphasis added).
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of duress exerted. The factor of mens rea - how illegal was the act,
and to what extent was the illegality known to the defendant - did not
seem to be in point on the question of guilt.
While the trial of the major war criminals was in progress, prepa-
rations were made for the trial of the subordinate officials. These
preparations culminated in Allied Control Council Law No. 10 (Decem-
ber 20, 1945), which authorized the four Occupation Zone commanders
to establish tribunals for these subsequent trials. Article II, Section
4(b) of Law No. 10 repeated almost verbatim Article 8 of the IMT
Charter, quoted above, rejecting superior orders as a defense but per-
mitting its consideration in mitigation."1
The American tribunals were created under Ordinance No. 7,
October 18, 1946, by order of the Military Government. These tri-
bunals conducted twelve trials involving 185 defendants, most of whom
raised the question of superior orders. The treatment of the defense
in these cases is significant, since the defendants here were not high
officials charged with formulating policy, but were the subordinates
charged with executing the previously established policy.
In the trials known as the Einsatzgruppen case,6" where the defen-
dants, charged with committing the worst atrocities of the war, raised
the defense of superior orders, the Tribunal stated:
The subordinate is bound only to obey the lawful orders of his
superior and if he accepts a criminal order and executes it with
a malice of his own, he may not plead superior orders in mitiga-
tion of his offense. If the nature of the ordered act is manifestly
beyond the scope of the superior's authority, the subordinate may
not plead ignorance to the criminality of the order.63
It would appear from the above statement that, despite the pro-
visions of the Charter and Law No. 10, if the defendant acted on his
own malice, though in accordance with a superior order, such order
may not be used even in mitigation. Though such a conclusion is a
rational and understandable one, particularly in view of the evidence
adduced in the Einsatzgruppen case, it introduced that very difficult
element of malice which previously had been omitted.
It will be recalled that the first impetus to consider superior orders
as a defense came from Professor Oppenheim in the second edition of
his book.6 4 It is ironic, then, that in the sixth and seventh editions,
published after World War II, Oppenheim (then edited by Lauter-
pacht) made a complete reversal. The text now states:
The fact that a rule of warfare has been violated in pursuance of
an order of the belligerent Government or of an individual belliger-
ent commander does not deprive the act in question of its character
61. See TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OP THE ARMY ON TIIE
NURNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAw No. 10, Appendix D,
250-51 (1949).
62. IV TRIALS, op. cit. supra note 26, at 471 (1949).
63. Id. at 470 (emphasis added).
64. II OPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 23.
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as a war crime; neither does it, in principle, confer upon the per-
petrator immunity from punishment by the injured belligerent.
A different view has occasionally been adopted in military manuals
and by writers, but it is difficult to regard it as expressing a sound
legal principle.0 5
Upon this history, it might be thought that the defense of superior
orders had at last been scrapped. But such is not the case - at least
not unequivocally.
In November, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly re-
quested the International Law Commission, a subsidiary body of the
U.N., to formulate the principles of international law recognized in the
Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal and to prepare a
draft code of offenses against the peace and security of mankind, in-
dicating the place to be accorded the said principles.6 In 1951, the
Commission completed a draft code which it submitted to the General
Assembly. Article 4 thereof provided, "The fact that a person charged
with an offense defined in this Code acted pursuant to order of his
government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility,
provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him."6 7
The General Assembly postponed consideration of the draft code
in order to give the member governments an opportunity to consider
it." Even after the responses from various governments had been re-
ceived, however, the matter was deleted from the agenda for two years.
The Commission, meanwhile, considered the responses, and revised its
draft, which it submitted to the General Assembly in 1954. Article 4
then read:
The fact that a person charged with an offense defined in this Code
acted pursuant to an order of his Government or of a superior does
not relieve him of responsibility in international law if, in the
circumstances at the time, it was possible for him not to comply
with that order.69
The change, according to the Commission, was prompted by the criti-
cism of some governments of the expression "moral choice." Thus,
physical duress became the test. Unmentioned in the Commission's
report, however, was the inclusion of the words "in international law"
in the revised draft. Presumably, this limitation would leave the
various nations free to treat disobedience to orders in their own way,
and could only weaken the practical effectiveness of the code.
In reality, however, the changes are of no importance, because the
code was never adopted by the General Assembly. It was instead
shelved, probably permanently, on the theory that it could not be en-
acted until the term "aggression" was adequately defined;7" it does
65. II OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 54, at 568.
66. Resolution 177, U.N. GEN. Ass. OrF. Rrc. 2d Sess. 111 (1947).
67. International Law Comm'n, Report, U.N. GSN. Ass. Ovv. REc. 6th Sess.,
Supp. No. 9 (A/1858) (1951).
68. U.N. GtN. Ass. Orv. Rmc. 6th Sess., Plenary 342 (1951).
69. U.N. GEN. Ass. OnF. Rxc. 9th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 10 (A/2693) (1954).
70. Resolution 1186, U.N. G4N. Ass. Ovv. Rc. 12th Sess., Plenary 727, at 571-73(1957).
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not appear likely that a suitable definition of that word will be found
in the near future. Thus, the one attempt to perpetuate the principles
of Nuremberg has failed.
The question of superior orders arose again, with only slightly
better success, in connection with the Genocide Convention. The origi-
nal resolution, introduced into the General Assembly by Cuba, India
and Panama, recommended that genocide and related offenses be dealt
with in the same manner as piracy and other international crimes (for
which superior orders was no defense). Great Britain and France
offered amendments to the resolution, declaring genocide to be an
international crime for which principals and accessories, individually,
could be held responsible.7 Saudi Arabia introduced a draft protocol,
which provided in Article III: "An allegation that any act of genocide
is political or has been committed under order of a superior authority
shall not be available as a defence."
72
With the numerous proposals before it, the Sixth Committee re-
ferred the question to a subcommittee for consideration. In subcom-
mittee, the Arabian proposal regarding superior orders was discarded,
and attempts to reintroduce it failed.7" In the final Convention, adopted
by the General Assembly on December 9, 1948, and declared effective
as of January 12, 1951, there is no specific reference to superior orders.
Article IV provides: "Persons committing genocide or any of the other
acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether they are con-
stitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals. '
74
It is noted that the United States has not ratified or acceded to the
Convention, and could therefore hardly rely upon it in any prosecutions
for its infringement.
The United States itself has apparently softened the position taken
in 1944. In July, 1956, Rule 345(1) of the U.S. Manual (renamed
The Law of Land Warfare) was revised to provide that superior orders
is not a defense "unless he [the accused] did not know and could not
reasonably have been expected to know that the act ordered was un-
lawful."75  This leaves open the loophole of evading punishment for
acts represented by superior officers as reprisals. The 1956 amend-
ment makes this clear when it states further:
In considering the question whether a superior order constitutes a
valid defense, the court shall take into consideration the fact that
obedience to lawful military orders is the duty of every member
of the armed forces; that the latter cannot be expected, in con-
ditions of war discipline, to weigh scrupulously the legal merits of
the orders received; that certain rules of warfare may be contro-
versial; or that an act otherwise amounting to a war crime may
be done in obedience to orders conceived as'a measure of reprisal.
71. U.N. Gi N. Ass. Orr. Ric. 1st Sess., 2d pt., 6th Comm., Annex. 15b, at 242-43
(A/C.6/83) (1946).
72. Id. at 244-45 (A/C.6/86).
73. Murray, The Present Position of International Criminal Justice, XXXVI
TRANSACIr. GROT. Soc'Y 191 (1951).
74. 78 U.N. TREATY StRius 278, 280.
75. THE LAW oF LAND WARFARE (FM 27-10) (1956).
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At the same time it must be borne in mind that members of the
armed forces are bound to obey only lawful orders (e.g., UCMJ,
Art. 92).6
This equivocal statement could serve as authority for the commis-
sion of almost every type of atrocity against the military forces of a
belligerent nation as well' as, in many cases, against civilians.
The failure of the United Nations to enact a clear statement on
superior orders and the equivocal statement of United States policy
raise a serious question! of whether the principles announced at Nurem-
berg can legitimately be relied upon in the future as a true expression
of existing international law. The doubt is strengthened when con-
sideration is given to the tacit or express rejection of clauses containing
clear statements on the subject.
V.
CONCLUSION
The development of superior orders as a defense seems to have
been in general conformity with the trend of political and social phi-
losophy since the 18th century. At first, the emphasis placed on the
rule of law rather than of men made the idea that a superior order
could justify a clearly illegal act an abhorrent one. Later, as the neo-
chivalry of military minds came into its own during the decade preced-
ing the First World War, the concept of obedience overshadowed the
possibility of a few isolated abuses of command. The author can only
picture this philosophy as emanating from the naive thought that
atrocity as a large-scale operation was something no civilized state
would condone, and no military officer would permit.
The abuses of World War I aroused some persons to re-examine
their thinking, but it took the wholesale slaughter of innocent persons
during World War II to shock the world's population completely out
of its complacency. With a repetition of such killing being made more,
rather than less, likely by the advance in technology, it would be a
tragic thing indeed if the world were now to revert to the unrealistic
policy of the first decade of the 20th century. Having once recognized
that the duty of obedience to superiors has some reasonable and pre-
scribed limitations, that standard, in the name of all humanity, cannot
logically or morally be abandoned.
The real danger, however, is not that superior orders would be
successful as a defense to the commission of future war crimes, although
the possibility of it exists. Rather, it is the failure to create a solid
and unimpeachable basis for rejecting the defense as a matter of law -
and not for reasons of political or emotional expedience - which is
so unfortunate. By enunciating the rule now in unmistakable terms, the
nations of the world can be rid of almost all of the so-called "organic"
defenses raised at Nuremberg and not have any half-doubts about
whether subsequent trials are in the nature of political executions.
76. Ibid.
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